Intruder Alert? How Stock Markets React to Potential IT Security Breaches: The Case of OpenSSL Heartbleed by Janze, Christian
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
BLED 2017 Proceedings BLED Proceedings
2017
Intruder Alert? How Stock Markets React to
Potential IT Security Breaches: The Case of
OpenSSL Heartbleed
Christian Janze
Goethe University Frankfurt, janze@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/bled2017
This material is brought to you by the BLED Proceedings at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in BLED 2017
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Janze, Christian, "Intruder Alert? How Stock Markets React to Potential IT Security Breaches: The Case of OpenSSL Heartbleed"
(2017). BLED 2017 Proceedings. 33.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/bled2017/33
30TH BLED ECONFERENCE: DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION – FROM 
CONNECTING THINGS TO TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES (JUNE 18 – 21, 
2017, BLED, SLOVENIA)  
A. Pucihar, M. Kljajić Borštnar, C. Kittl, P. Ravesteijn, R. Clarke & R. 
Bons 
 
 
 
 
Intruder Alert? How Stock Markets React to  
Potential IT Security Breaches: The Case of  
OpenSSL Heartbleed 
  18 
CHRISTIAN JANZE 
 
Abstract This exploratory study investigates how potential information 
technology security breaches affect stock prices. Previous research 
indicates that stock markets tend to punish firms that experience unsolicited 
disclosure of information and proprietary data. However, little research 
exists on the question of whether firms are punished for creating the mere 
potential for data theft. Based on the information boundary theory, we 
design our exploratory research model. Subsequently, we utilize a sample 
of 4,147 stocks of firms headquartered in 43 countries to conduct multiple 
event studies. We reveal a delayed adverse stock market response to 
potential IT security breaches as well as a discrimination among firms 
operating in different industries. Consequently, this work enhances the 
understanding of the full economic impact of information security 
measures by shedding light on previously neglected hidden costs. 
 
Keywords: • Economics • Finance • Information Security • Event Study • 
Heartbleed • 
                                                          
CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Christian Janze, Goethe University Frankfurt, Theodor-W.-Adorno-
Platz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, e-mail: janze@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de. 
 
https://doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-043-1.18  ISBN 978-961-286-043-1 
© 2017 University of Maribor Press 
Available at: http://press.um.si. 
246 30TH BLED ECONFERENCE: DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION – FROM CONNECTING THINGS TO 
TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES (JUNE 18 – 21, 2017, BLED, SLOVENIA)  
C. Janze: Intruder Alert? How Stock Markets React to Potential IT Security Breaches: 
The Case of OpenSSL Heartbleed 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
Hardly a day passes without reports of large-scale attacks against IT infrastructures 
launched by internal and external perpetrators. These attacks frequently result in the 
unintentional disclosure of confidential information and proprietary data (Liedtke 2014, 
Zetter 2013).  
 
Previous research on the economic impact of IT security breaches on affected firms 
focuses on realized unsolicited disclosure of information and proprietary data (Acquisti 
et al. 2006, Campbell et al. 2003, Cavusoglu et al. 2004, Ettredge and Richardson 2002, 
Goel and Shawky 2009, Hovav and D’Arcy 2003, Kannan et al. 2007, Telang and Wattal 
2007). However, we argue that it is equally likely that stock markets punish firms for 
creating the mere possibility of a data theft. This is because of a diminished trust in the 
firms' capabilities to protect sensitive data with adversarial effects on future sales and 
thus its stock price, which resembles the discounted value of expected future dividends 
(which are directly linked to sales). Thus, within this study, we examine the overall 
research question of the impact of potential IT security breaches on stock prices.  
 
We draw on information boundary theory (IBT) to investigate our research question. 
Specifically, we study the impact of the Heartbleed vulnerability within the widely used 
cryptographic library OpenSSL (OpenSSL 2014a) on the value of 4,147 publicly traded 
firms. OpenSSL is used to secure connections in computer networks (Durumeric et al. 
2014) and was enabled on approximately two-thirds of all webservers worldwide when 
Heartbleed was publicly announced (Goodin 2014). Examples of affected services 
include Facebook, Instagram, Google Search, Gmail, Youtube, Yahoo Search, Yahoo 
Mail and Dropbox (Mashable 2014). Our exploratory findings reveal a time-delayed 
response of stock markets to potential IT security breaches as well as a discrimination 
among firms operating in different industries. 
 
The remaining portion of this paper is structured as follows. Section two provides 
background on related research, privacy theory as well as our research model. Section 
three provides information on our research methodology. Section four presents the results 
of our study and discusses its implications. Section five concludes the study.  
 
 Background and Research Model 
 
2.1 Research on Realized IT Security Breaches 
 
As summarized in Table 1, previous research can be largely divided into the impact of 
data & security breach announcements on firms and vulnerability disclosures on software 
vendors (Telang and Wattal 2007). 
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Table 1: Results of IT Security Related Event Studies by Covered Topic (Partially 
adapted from Acquisti et al. (2006) and Telang and Wattal (2007)) 
Topic 
Time 
Period 
Event
s 
Event 
Window 
CAAR 
(%) 
Author(s) 
Firms 
2000-2005 79 [0, +1] -0.58 Acquisti et al. (2006) 
1995-2000 43 [-1, +1] -1.88 Campbell et al. (2003) 
1998-2000 66 [0, +1] -2.00 Cavusoglu et al. (2004) 
2004-2008 168 N/A -1.00 Goel and Shawky (2009) 
1998-2002 23 [-1, +1] N/A Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) 
1997-2003 72 [-1, +7] -3.17 Kannan et al. (2007) 
Feb. 2000 115 [+1, +3] -3.00%2 
Ettredge and Richardson 
(2002) 
Vend
ors 
1999-2004 146 [0, +1] -0.63 Telang and Wattal (2007) 
 
First, results regarding the overall impact of security & data breach announcements are 
mixed. While some authors find negative cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
of publicly traded firms’ stock prices ranging from -0.58% to -3.17% over short-horizon 
event windows below 10 days (Acquisti et al. 2006, Cavusoglu et al. 2004, Ettredge and 
Richardson 2002, Kannan et al. 2007) others don’t. For example, numerous studies find 
limited evidence of overall abnormal price effects but strong evidence for discrimination 
among firm and event characteristics (Campbell et al. 2003, Ettredge and Richardson 
2002, Hovav and D’Arcy 2003). Campbell et al. (2003) finds no evidence for an overall 
effect but strong and statistically significant support for negative effects of security 
breaches that involve unauthorized access to confidential data (-5.46%). Exemplary for 
evidence of discrimination among the type of firms are Hovav and D’Arcy (2003), who 
find a statistically negative CAAR of internet-centered firms only and Ettredge and 
Richardson (2002), who find a negative CAAR of internet-centric firms. Second, 
software vendors that created vulnerable products were negatively affected and 
experienced a CAAR of -0.63% associated with the announcement of a vulnerability 
within their products and services (Telang and Wattal 2007).  
 
In summary, previous research focuses on the impact of realized IT security breaches. 
However, little research exists on the question whether stock markets punish firms for 
creating the mere potential to breach their IT security.  
 
 
2.2 Heartbleed Vulnerability 
 
On April 7th, 2014, the existence of Heartbleed, a vulnerability within the cryptographic 
library OpenSSL was publicly announced (Codenomicon 2014, Schneier 2014). 
Heartbleed is the result of an improper implementation of the Heartbeat Extension 
(Durumeric et al. 2014) specified in Request for Comments 6520 (RFC6520), and affects 
official OpenSSL versions 1.0.1 to 1.0.1f (OpenSSL 2014b). Heartbleed creates the 
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recurring possibility of unsolicited remote copying of small chunks of random memory 
content from a service without the need for any authorization or leaving any traces 
(Schneier 2014). Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)-2014-0160 states that 
Heartbleed “allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process 
memory via crafted packets that trigger a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by reading 
private keys“ (MITRE Corporation 2014).  
 
Heartbleed was introduced to the OpenSSL codebase on December 31, 2011 (22:59:57 
UTC) (Seggelmann 2012) and widely distributed on March 14th, 2012 with the release 
of OpenSSL version 1.01 (OpenSSL 2012). Grubb (2014) states that Heartbleed was 
discovered for the first time on or before March 21st, 2014 by Neel Mahta of Google 
Security (OpenSSL 2014b). Thus, the exploitation of fully patched services running 
OpenSSL was theoretically possible for approximately two years.  
 
2.3 Research Model to Study Potential IT Security Breaches 
 
The concept of privacy is considered to be of undisputed importance to societies of 
modern economies (Xu et al. 2008) and has been studied for centuries (Bélanger and 
Crossler 2011). However, grasping the concept of privacy is cumbersome because of its 
manifold definitions (Solove 2006). Acquisti et al. (2006) notes that attempts of precise 
definitions of privacy oftentimes “remain ambiguous, changing with the perspective of 
the observer”, a view that is shared by Introna and Pouloudi (1999). Nevertheless, in a 
landmark paper called “The Right to Privacy”, published in 1890 by Warren and 
Brandeis, the authors reasoned that the concept of privacy gradually evolved over time to 
“the right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890). This view is still reflected by 
modern definitions with “the notion of privacy as freedom from the judgment of others” 
(Introna and Pouloudi 1999). Acquisti et al. (2006), defines a privacy incident roughly as 
a failure of mechanisms designed to protect personal information of customers’, partners’ 
or employees from threats of technical, managerial, organizational or human nature. The 
Heartbleed vulnerability thus represents an IT security related privacy incident.  
 
IBT is the result of a research program to investigate the impact of monitoring and 
surveillance technology on the perceived privacy of workers (Stanton and Stam 2003).  
Xu et al. (2008) describes IBT as an explanatory framework that allows for studying 
social impacts of information disclosures: IBT states that people possess unique physical 
or virtual informational spaces. These spaces are limited by clearly defined boundaries. 
Attempts of external entities to cross these boundaries might be perceived as an intrusion 
into the informational space. The extent of this perception is dependent on situational and 
personal conditions (Xu et al. 2008). According to Stanton and Stam (2002), IBT 
represents the synthesis of three separate constructs: First, the communications boundary 
management theory (Petronio 1991). Second, the group value approach to organizational 
justice (Alder 1998, Alder and Tompkins 1997). Third, a general expectancy valence 
framework for privacy protection (Stone and Stone 1990). IBT is comparable to attempts 
of Moor (1997) to conceptualize multiple theories of privacy. IBT is in-line with the 
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reasoning that “the unifying feature of privacy incidents is the violation of certain 
expectations about how data will be handled” (Acquisti et al. 2006). Xu et al. (2008) show 
that IBT can be applied in an information privacy context to describe the formation of an 
individual’s privacy concerns.  
 
Table 2 distinguishes two groups of firms by the overall news the public announcement 
of Heartbleed conveyed to firm stakeholders. Group A includes firms that were protecting 
their webserver by a vulnerable version of OpenSSL, allowing for the exploitation of 
Heartbleed. Group B covers firms that were protecting their webserver with an unaffected 
SSL/TLS solution.  
 
Table 2: Groups of Firms by News Heartbleed Conveyed to Stakeholders 
Heartbleed 
Group 
Webserver Protected by 
SSL/TLS? 
Webserver 
Vulnerable? 
News to Firms' 
Stakeholders 
Group A Yes Yes Bad News 
Group B Yes No Good News 
 
Research hypotheses set H1 deals with the overall impact of potential IT security 
breaches within Group A and B and is based on IBT. We hypothesize that firms within 
Group A experience a reduction in shareholders’ equity value, approximated by free-float 
stock prices, at the time of the public announcement of the Heartbleed vulnerability. 
Primarily because we assume that the announcement induced a re-assessment of firm 
stakeholders regarding the risk of unwanted information disclosure. This reassessment 
may result in a change in outcome from an acceptable- to an unacceptable risk as 
suggested by the IBT. This outcome is primarily driven by an increased perception of 
privacy intrusion induced by Heartbleed. In other words, stakeholders experienced 
negative news and responded with a decreased willingness to provide confidential 
information, which ultimately decreases business opportunity of affected firms. This 
reduced ability to conduct business will decrease future revenues and ultimately the 
amount of dividends a firm is able to pay out. Ceteris paribus (same dividend-pay-out 
ratios, overall growth projections and equity cost of capital) and assuming that stock 
prices are primarily determined by the present value of expected future dividend 
payments, this results in a decrease in stock value (Berk and DeMarzo 2011). The 
resulting research hypothesis, in which negative stock market reactions refer to falling 
share prices, is explicitly stated as:  
 
H1a. Negative stock market reaction in Group A around the public disclosure of potential 
IT security breaches. 
 
Additionally, we hypothesize that Group B firms experienced a positive effect on 
shareholders’ equity valuations at the time of potential IT security breach 
announcements. Especially because the knowledge that the firm was not affected by 
Heartbleed, despite being protected by SSL/TLS – may lead to a positive outcome of the 
re-assessment of the risk of unwanted information disclosure. This in turn attracts new 
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business opportunities through stakeholders, which previously assessed the risk as 
unacceptable. Furthermore, it is likely that stakeholders of Group A switched to Group B 
after assessing the risk of Group A firms as unacceptable, which again results in an 
increased ability of Group B firms to conduct business. Thus, and under the same 
assumptions regarding the effect on future dividend payments introduced in the last 
paragraph, this should result in an increase in the stock price of Group B firms: 
 
H1b. Positive stock market reaction in Group B around the public disclosure of potential 
IT security breaches. 
 
IBT states that people construct personal informational spaces within boundaries that - 
among other things – depend on the nature of information in question. We assume that 
firms in different industries process different types of information, of which some are 
considered of greater importance than others to the overall risk-evaluation process of firm 
stakeholders. For example, firms in the Communications or Financial Services industry 
may process more confidential information than firms in the Materials sector. Thus, we 
hypothesize that there are industry specific differences in the outcome of the re-
assessment of the risk of unwanted information disclosure, which in combination with 
the reasoning of the last section yields the second set of hypotheses (H2): 
 
H2a. Existence of industry specific differences in negative stock market reaction of firms 
within Group A around the public disclosure of potential IT security breaches. 
 
H2b. Existence of industry specific differences in positive stock market reaction of firms 
within Group B around the public disclosure of potential IT security breaches. 
 
 Methodology  
 
3.1 Event Study Design 
 
Event studies are commonly used to examine the effect of specific events on the value of 
firms (Konchitchki and O’Leary 2011). While MacKinlay (1997) broadly defines event 
studies as “using financial market data [to] measure the impact of a specific event on the 
value of a firm“, others developed a more narrow understanding and note that ”event 
studies examine the behavior of firms’ stock prices around corporate events“ (Kothari 
and Warner 2007).  
 
In event studies, the timeline is divided into the estimation window, the event window 
and the post event window (Campbell et al. 1996). Returns are indexed in event time t, 
where t=0 represents the event date. Returns prior (post) the event date are typically 
indexed with negative (positive) integers relative to the event date (Acquisti et al. 2006, 
Campbell et al. 2003). At its core, event studies assess the effect of an event on the 
performance of a security in the event window by subtracting the expected return of a 
security from actual observed returns to get abnormal returns and subsequently 
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aggregating these over time and/or securities. Thus, the estimated abnormal return 
(AR) ̂_it  of a given security i at time t can be written as 
 
𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡  | 𝑋𝑖𝑡), 
 
where R_it  represents the actual observed ex-post return and E(R_it  ┤|  X_t) the ex-ante 
normal return with X_it as the conditioning information of the normal return model 
(Campbell et al. 1996).  
 
Two predominant normal return estimation models (MacKinlay 1997) are the constant 
mean return model and the market model, in which X_it is the market return that is the 
same for each security i but changes with t (Campbell et al. 1996). The market model 
R_it= α_i+β_i R_mt+ξ_it, linearly relates the return R_it of a security i at time t to the 
return R_mt of market portfolio m at time t with disturbance term ξ_it that exhibits an 
expected value of zero and variance σ_(ξ_i)^2 (MacKinlay 1997). Parameters of the 
market model are the intercept α_i and the slope β_i of security i, which can be 
empirically determined by means of OLS regression using estimation window data 
(MacKinlay 1997).  
The abnormal return (AR) ̂_it of security i at time t within the event window using the 
market model can then be estimated as 
 
𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡  − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 , 
 
where α ̂_iand (β ̂_i )  ̂are OLS estimators of the market model. 
 
Event studies typically deal with more than one security and event windows that span 
over multiple days. Abnormal Returns (AR’s) are therefore aggregated to draw overall 
inferences of the events’ impact on returns (MacKinlay 1997), which can be done across 
time, across securities and both across security and time (Campbell et al. 1996). The 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) ̂(a,b) of n securities over a time-period 
within the event window spanning from t=a to b can be written as 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴?̂?(𝑎, 𝑏) =  
1
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡 .
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Empirical research indicates that stock prices are not normally distributed (Brown and 
Warner 1985). This is typically addressed by using non-parametric tests when analysing 
abnormal returns of a single day (Kolari and Pynnonen 2011). However, problems arise 
when non-parametric tests are applied over multiple days on a CAR basis (Cowan 1992, 
Kolari and Pynnonen 2010). Thus, Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) proposed a Generalized 
Rank (GRANK) testing procedure which in simulations outperformed previous non-
parametric ranks tests and exhibits superior robustness to serial correlation and increased 
volatility induced by the event as well as cross-sectional correlation of returns due to 
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event day clustering. Additionally, GRANK often has good or higher empirical power 
when compared to highly popular parametric tests such as the ordinary t-test or BMP t-
test. This holds true for event windows of any given length. Therefore, we rely on 
GRANK in the following. 
 
3.2 Economeric Design 
 
Table 3 summarizes the econometric design of each event study designed to put research 
hypotheses sets H1 and H2 to test and are repeated for good and bad news firms. The 
event of interest is the public announcement of the Heartbleed vulnerability within the 
cryptographic library OpenSSL on April 7th, 2014. The market model with daily close 
prices was chosen for estimating the normal returns. First, because gains from more 
sophisticated multi-factor models such as CAPM and APT based as Fama-French-3-
Factor over statistical models are limited (MacKinlay 1997). Second, the market model 
is slightly less affected by cross-sectional return correlation in the presence of event-date 
clustering than the Fama-French-3-Factor-Model (Kolari and Pynnonen 2011). The 
estimation window length to estimate the regression coefficient is 200 trading days, 
which roughly equals the mean (median) of 52 papers including event studies in IS 
research originally compiled by Konchitchki and O’Leary (2011). Three different event 
window lengths, covering 3, 13 and 23 days respectively are applied. The short-horizon 
event window of three days complies with the econometric reasoning of superiority of 
short-horizon event windows by Konchitchki and O’Leary (2011). The medium- and 
long-horizon event windows are designed to capture potential information leakage prior 
to the event and delayed stock market reaction and act as a robustness check. Inclusion 
criteria are varying BICS level 1 classifications of firms and data cleaning rules. Missing 
close price data was replaced by applying Last Observation Carried Forward (LOCF) and 
subsequently Next Observation Carried Backward (NOCB) for each security with less 
than or equal to 20 missing observations, which equals 10% of the estimation window 
length. Daily returns exceeding 100% were replaced by 0% to remove very few outliers. 
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Table 3: Econometric Design of Event Studies 
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Hypotheses Set   
H
1 
H 
2 
H
1 
H 
2 
H
1 
H 
2 
E
v
e
n
t 
S
tu
d
y
 P
a
ra
m
e
te
rs
 
Normal 
Return  
Model 
Model (Benchmark 
Index) 
Market Model (MSCI World Price Index) 
Event  
Date 
Calendar Time (Event 
Time) 2014-04-07 [0] 
Trading Days 1 
Estimati
on  
Window 
Calendar Time 
Start 2013-06-28 2013-06-21 2013-06-14 
End 2014-04-03 2014-03-27 2014-03-20 
Event Time [-201,-2] [-206, -7] [-211, -12] 
Trading days 200 
Event  
Window 
Calendar Time 
Start 2014-04-04 2014-03-28 2014-03-21 
End 2014-04-08 2014-04-15 2014-04-22 
Event Time [-1, +1] [-6, +6] [-11, +11] 
Trading days 3 13 23 
In
c
lu
s
io
n
 C
ri
te
ri
a
 Industri
es 
Communications x x                   x x                   x x                   
Consumer 
Discretionary 
x   x                 x   x                 x   x                 
Consumer Staples x     x               x     x               x     x               
Energy x       x             x       x             x       x             
Financials x         x           x         x           x         x           
Health Care x           x         x           x         x           x         
Industrials x             x       x             x       x             x       
Materials x               x     x               x     x               x     
Technology x                 x   x                 x   x                 x   
Utilities x                   x x                   x x                   x 
Data 
Cleanin
g  
Rules 
Maximum Missing 
Returns 
20 
Missing Price 
Data 
LOCF x 
NOCB x 
Outlier Threshold 100% 
 
 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The primary inclusion criterion applied is the membership of a firm’s stock in at least one 
of nine selected major stock indices as of June 24th, 2014. The resulting set is presented 
in Table 4 and includes a total of 4,873 constituents. Removing duplicate stocks that were 
member of more than one index lowered this number by 726 to a final number of 4,147. 
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Price data of all 4,147 stocks in the sample are compiled for the time-period of January 
2nd, 2013 to July 21st, 2014. The total number of 1,483,352 HLOC price observations 
stem from Google Finance (857,447), Bloomberg Professional (527,755), Stooq (84,218) 
and Quandl (13,012). In addition, daily price data of MSCI World was acquired from 
Thompson Reuters Datastream. Meta data regarding the vulnerability of each of the 4,147 
firms were compiled to assess the potential impact of the Heartbleed vulnerability on 
affected firms: Heartbleed, as previously shown, affected a multitude of software and 
hardware solutions: Webservers reached by the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) 
were selected as a proxy for a firm’s vulnerability level. FQDNS of 4,137 of the 4,147 
firms in the sample could be compiled. The remaining firms did not operate a webserver. 
Historic scan data from these webservers, allowing for determining each firm’s 
vulnerability level prior to Heartbleed’s public announcement on April 7th, 2014, 
originate from Netcraft Ltd. and are aggregated into three categories previously presented 
in Table 2. In addition, all of the 4,137 available FQDN’s were rescanned on September 
1st, 2014 using “Heartbleed-Masstest” written by Al-Bassam (2014).  
 
Table 4: Sample Constituents by Stock Index, Coverage, Focus and Operator 
Index Constituents Coverage Region Operator 
Bloomberg European 
500 
501 Large Cap Europe Bloomberg L.P. 
CAC 40 40 Large Cap France Euronext N.V. 
DAX 30 30 Large Cap Germany Deutsche Börse AG 
EURO STOXX 50 50 Large Cap Europe STOXX Ltd. 
NASDAQ Composite 2,526 All Cap U.S. NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. 
Nikkei-225 Stock 
Average 
225 Large Cap Japan Nikkei Inc. 
S&P 400 400 Mid Cap U.S. S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 
S&P 500 501 Large Cap U.S. S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 
STOXX Europe 600 600 All Cap Europe STOXX Ltd. 
Total Constituents  4,147    
 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of vulnerability levels within the total constituent sample 
of 4,147 firms before and after the public announcement of Heartbleed on April 7th, 2014.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Vulnerability Levels within Total Constituent Sample 
 
4.2 Overall Impact (H1) 
 
Hypotheses set H1 is concerned with the overall impact of potential IT security breaches 
on stock prices of publicly traded firms. Table 5 presents empirical results by providing 
CAARs and results of two-tailed non-directional GRANK-T tests over short-, medium-, 
and long-horizon event windows. The null hypothesis tested by the tgrank test statistic 
states that there is no mean effect while the alternative is that there is a mean effect (Kolari 
and Pynnonen 2011). 
 
Table 5: Overall Impact of Potential IT Security Breaches on Publicly Traded Firms 
Event Study  
Group A "Bad News" Group B "Good News" 
n CAAR tgrank p n CAAR tgrank p 
ES1a (Short-Horizon) 538 -1.45% 1.52 0.13 1,647 -1.24% 1.39 0.17 
ES2a (Medium-Horizon) 537 -2.94% 1.85 0.07* 1,644 -2.58% 1.81 0.07* 
ES3a (Long-Horizon) 536 -5.28% 2.40 0.02** 1,638 -4.30% 2.32 0.02** 
 
Hypothesis H1a predicts a negative stock market reaction in Group A around the public 
disclosure of potential IT security breaches. There is little empirical support of statistical 
significance for this prediction in the short-horizon event-window as shown in Table 5. 
However, in the medium- and long-horizon event windows, the Group A CAARs of -
2.94% and -5.28% is of statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
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Figure 2: Impact of Potential IT Security Breaches on CAARs 
 
Figure 2 presents the development of the overall impact of Heartbleed within each event-
horizon: In the short-horizon event window, Group A firms’ CAAR is most negative at 
the time of the public announcement of Heartbleed. Looking at the medium-horizon event 
window length, this recovery of Group A continues until April 9th, 2014, when the 
CAAR starts to drop even further. The long-horizon event window again shows the two 
local minima of CAAR in Group A on April 7th and April 15th, 2014 and an additional 
one around March 28th, 2014. Thus, we observe a time-delayed response of stock markets 
to potential IT security breaches. 
 
H1b predicts a positive stock market reaction in Group B around the public disclosure of 
potential IT security breaches. Table 5 reveals that there is little empirical support for this 
prediction in the short run. The effect on firms’ stock prices in Group B is negative with 
CAARs of -1.24%, -2.58% and -4.30% in the respective short-, medium and long-horizon 
event windows. While this effect was of no statistical significance in the first case, it was 
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in the latter two cases at the 10% and 5% level. However, Figure 2 reveals that firms in 
the Group B performed better, relative to firms in Group A. 
 
4.3 Industry Specific Differences (H2) 
 
H2a predicts the existence of industry specific differences in negative stock market 
reaction of firms within Group A around public disclosure of potential IT security 
breaches. Results presented in Table 6 seem to support this prediction. Most industry 
specific CAARs in the short-horizon event window are of no statistical significance 
according to the two-tailed GRANK-T test. However, firms operating in the Consumer 
Discretionary and Health Care industry experienced CAARs of -1.43 and -2.59%, which 
are significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Interestingly, when looking at the 
results of the medium-horizon event window, the statistical significance of the effect on 
firms in the Consumer Discretionary sector vanishes. Instead, the CAAR of -4.9% of 
firms in the Communication sector becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
addition, the effect on the Health Care industry becomes significant at the 1% level with 
a CAAR of -6.55%. In the long-horizon event window, eight out of ten industries 
experienced an effect of statistical significance at the 10% level ranging from CAARs of 
-9.47% to +4.4%.  
 
H2b predicts the existence of industry specific differences in positive stock market 
reaction of firms within Group B around public disclosure of potential IT security 
breaches: Table 6 indicates that there is little support for this prediction in the short-
horizon event window, as only the CAAR of -1.40% in the Consumer Discretionary 
sector is of statistical significance. Additionally, there is little support for the predicted 
positive effect as the vast majority of industry specific CAARs is negative. In the 
medium-horizon event window, three industries experienced a significant effect with 
CAARs ranging from -3.14 (Communications), over 3.91% (Technology) to -8.82% 
(Health Care). In the long-horizon event window, these negative effects increases even 
more. In addition, the negative effects within the Consumer Discretionary and Financials 
sectors are statistical significance. 
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Table 6: Industry Specific Impact of Potential IT Security Breaches on Stock Prices 
ID Industry 
Group A  Group B  
n CAAR tgrank p n CAAR tgrank p 
Short-Horizon Event Window: 
ES1a All Industries 538 -1.45% 1.520 0.1302 1647 -1.24% 1.389 0.1665 
ES1b Communications 47 -1.91% 1.411 0.1598 101 -1.57% 1.444 0.1503 
ES1c Consumer Discretionary 129 -1.43% 1.717 0.0876* 231 -1.40% 2.043 0.0424** 
ES1d Consumer Staples 28 -2.04% 1.415 0.1587 104 0.21% 0.314 0.7536 
ES1e Energy 20 -0.02% 0.677 0.4991 76 -1.13% 0.420 0.6751 
ES1f Financials 78 -1.17% 0.901 0.3685 404 -1.00% 1.148 0.2525 
ES1g Health Care 66 -2.59% 2.237 0.0264** 173 -2.56% 1.123 0.2627 
ES1h Industrials 39 -0.88% 0.935 0.3511 182 -1.09% 1.385 0.1677 
ES1i Materials 17 -0.48% 0.443 0.6584 96 -0.34% 0.051 0.9593 
ES1j Technology 112 -1.27% 1.389 0.1663 225 -2.07% 1.582 0.1153 
ES1k Utilities 2 -0.35% 0.225 0.8220 55 0.88% 0.934 0.3513 
Medium-Horizon Event Window: 
ES2a All Industries 537 -2.94% 1.850 0.0658* 1644 -2.58% 1.809 0.0719* 
ES2b Communications 47 -4.90% 3.037 0.0027*** 101 -3.14% 2.472 0.0143** 
ES2c Consumer Discretionary 129 -2.15% 1.346 0.1799 231 -2.26% 1.614 0.1081 
ES2d Consumer Staples 28 -2.40% 0.105 0.9164 104 -0.24% 0.106 0.9155 
ES2e Energy 20 2.30% 1.561 0.1200 76 0.75% 1.176 0.2412 
ES2f Financials 78 -1.88% 1.434 0.1531 403 -1.90% 1.354 0.1772 
ES2g Health Care 66 -6.55% 2.978 0.0033*** 172 -8.82% 3.641 0.0003*** 
ES2h Industrials 39 -0.96% 0.515 0.6075 181 -2.00% 1.162 0.2467 
ES2i Materials 17 -0.76% 0.626 0.5319 96 0.39% 0.307 0.7592 
ES2j Technology 111 -3.74% 1.638 0.1030 225 -3.91% 2.118 0.0354** 
ES2k Utilities 2 -2.26% 0.500 0.6177 55 0.89% 0.472 0.6372 
Long-Horizon Event Window: 
ES3a All Industries 536 -5.28% 2.399 0.0174** 1638 -4.30% 2.320 0.0214** 
ES3b Communications 47 -7.90% 2.632 0.0091*** 101 -5.85% 3.028 0.0028*** 
ES3c Consumer Discretionary 129 -4.40% 1.982 0.0488** 231 -4.27% 2.126 0.0347** 
ES3d Consumer Staples 28 -3.98% 1.269 0.2059 103 0.33% 1.170 0.2433 
ES3e Energy 20 4.40% 1.908 0.0579* 76 -0.67% 0.888 0.3757 
ES3f Financials 78 -3.74% 1.902 0.0586* 400 -4.42% 2.272 0.0242** 
ES3g Health Care 66 -9.47% 3.088 0.0023*** 172 -11.16% 3.924 0.0001*** 
ES3h Industrials 38 -1.74% 0.259 0.7962 179 -2.56% 1.402 0.1623 
ES3i Materials 17 -3.82% 1.940 0.0538* 96 1.95% 1.369 0.1724 
ES3j Technology 111 -7.44% 2.504 0.0131** 225 -6.88% 2.947 0.0036*** 
ES3k Utilities 2 3.65% 2.628 0.0092*** 55 1.12% 0.619 0.5369 
 
Limitations of this work are primarily related to the underlying event study methodology. 
These can be divided into problems related to theoretical assumptions and research design 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Theoretical assumptions are (1) efficient markets, (2) no-
anticipation of the event examined and (3) the absence of confounding events 
30TH BLED ECONFERENCE: DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION – FROM CONNECTING THINGS TO 
TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES (JUNE 18 – 21, 2017, BLED, SLOVENIA)  
C. Janze: Intruder Alert? How Stock Markets React to Potential IT Security Breaches: 
The Case of OpenSSL Heartbleed 
259 
 
 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). First, regarding the efficient markets assumption, we 
assumed that people are both able to find and make sense of publicly available 
information. While easy to find, it is possible that firm stakeholders were unable to make 
sense of it due to the technical sophistication of the Heartbleed vulnerability. Thus, even 
if large investors were aware of the problem, they may have concluded that other 
stakeholders were not and assumed no re-evaluation of the risk of unintentional 
disclosure of private information would take place. Second, event anticipation is unlikely 
as search query data of Google and Wikipedia revealed no interest in Heartbleed prior its 
public disclosure. Third, it is not possible to control for confounding events when 
analyzing a sample of 4,147 firms. However, effects are likely to be wiped out due to the 
large sample size and are especially unlikely in the short-horizon event window where 
the economic calendar provided by ECONODAY reveals no event window 
contaminating news. Typical additional issues of event studies are the sample size, the 
identification of outliers, the length and justification of the event window and further 
explanation of abnormal returns (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Because of the large data 
sample, explicitly defined outlier return thresholds, theoretically justified event windows 
and research hypotheses, these should not pose a significant issue. Next to these 
limitations, future confirmatory studies must examine comparable large scale IT security 
issues where a multitude of firms are affected. 
 
 Conclusion and Outlook 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the global impact of potential IT security 
breaches on stock markets. Thereby, it enhances the understanding of the full economic 
impact of information privacy measures by shedding light on previously neglected hidden 
costs. By drawing on IBT, research hypotheses are developed and put to test by means of 
multiple large scale event studies covering 4,147 firms headquartered in 43 countries.  
 
First, our exploratory study indicates that stock markets react with a time delay to 
potential IT security breaches. Second, we provide evidence for a discrimination of firms 
operating in different industries. Therefore, this work extends the understanding of 
consequences of jeopardized IT security by adding a previously neglected hidden cost 
component to information privacy considerations. Future scientific research in this field 
could investigate additional determinants of the discrimination of stock markets between 
potential and actual IT security breaches.  
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